**Introduction**

The tension between beauty and inclusion define the urban planning dilemmas of Chandigarh in the 21st century. Popularly termed as “City Beautiful” and designed by Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier at the behest of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Chandigarh was the first planned city of India. Besides the administrative role of serving as capital of Punjab and managing the partition induced influx of refugees, it was intended to be an expression of modern India; envisioned by Nehru in 1952 as “unfettered by the traditions of the past, a symbol of the nation's faith in the future”[[1]](#footnote-0).

*De-Slumification as a Concrete Planning Objective*

70 years since this conception, Chandigarh continues to pursue developmental projects driven by spatial planning processes. The most recent proposed expression of this has been the 2031 Chandigarh Master Plan. It seeks to regulate development and building activity in the entire area of the Union Territory of Chandigarh which covers 144 km2 including 60 sectors and peripheral areas. Despite receiving the final approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2015, the progress made in the implementation phases remains low which has emerged as a cause of concern for the local policy makers.[[2]](#footnote-1) Yet, a key objective of this plan is exceeding temporal targets, as the target of March 2022 to execute a complete “deslumification” of the city. While, similar to 2013 and 2017, this target has not been met - and failure has been attributed to the rise of new slums - the administration remains committed to a complete demolition of slums in the city.

Beyond the narrative of slums as antithetical to a “City Beautiful” and “Planned City”, such strong policy intent to remove slums comes in the context of Chandigarh having the second highest urban density of population (behind Delhi) and one of the highest percentage increases in population from 2.6 lakh in 1971 to 10.6 lakh in 2011 (Census).[[3]](#footnote-2) This is accompanied by migrants constituting 64.1% of the city’s population and approximately 60% of these migrants have been living in Chandigarh for more than 10 years. This link between migration and growth of slums was substantiated by Charles J. Stokes in his paper “A Theory of Slums” (1962)[[4]](#footnote-3) where the author postulates “slum formation depends on the rate of in-migration as well as on the rate of integration or absorption of the migrants”. Yet, an undertone to the argument which often gets overlooked is his emphasis on a lack of upward social mobility that results in expansion and long term presence of slums.

As a result of data constraints on intergenerational income and lack of jobs[[5]](#footnote-4), there exists a gap in data specific to Chandigarh. Yet, utilising education metrics, Asher, Novosad and Rafkin (2022) have posited that social mobility in India has largely remained unchanged and stagnated from the 1950s to 1990s[[6]](#footnote-5). This comes despite, according to a World Economic Forum report covering 27 countries, Indians believe in upward social mobility more than any other nationality[[7]](#footnote-6).

While it would be useful to have a study which analyses the extent to which social (im)mobility has influenced a rise in slum population in Chandigarh, this paper instead seeks to study the impact created by the local administration’s rampant de-slumification campaign. Specifically, this research is investigating the nature and consequence of resettlement measures.

*Analysis of the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006)*

In the landmark case, *Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985)*, the Supreme Court held that rights to livelihood, dignity and housing are components of Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution.[[8]](#footnote-7) This judgement specifically outlined that it is mandatory for forced evictions of slum dwellers to be accompanied by provisions of housing resettlement. Further, in 2019, the Delhi High Court ruled in the *Ajay Maken v. Union of India* case that dwellers of slums which have been demolished are entitled to adequate housing.[[9]](#footnote-8) These judgements have been guided by instruments of international human rights law such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights[[10]](#footnote-9) and International Covenant of Economic and Social Rights[[11]](#footnote-10), alongside case laws from South Africa[[12]](#footnote-11) and Bangladesh[[13]](#footnote-12). Even in the legal jurisdiction of Chandigarh, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 2022 placed a stay on demolition of slums due to lack of resettlement guarantee, despite acknowledging the illegal land encroachment by the slum dwellers[[14]](#footnote-13).

As a result of these case laws, slum evictions in Chandigarh have been largely complemented by resettlement measures under the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006). This policy departs from the rhetoric of lack of basic amenities and safety in slums coupled with illegal land encroachments as the justification for their demolition. Subsequently, it declares its objective to provide legal housing and improve quality of life.

In terms of eligibility, beneficiaries of this program must be “recognised residents” from the 18 colonies determined in 2006 where biometric surveys were conducted. A “recognised resident” refers to a resident of a notified colony included in both the Voter List of 1st January 2006 and the biometric survey. If qualified as a “recognised resident”, an individual was allotted 1 small flat for the family on a licence fee payment system. This means that the allottee is supposed to pay a monthly fee (set at 800 INR for the first 5 years of ownership followed by an incremental increase after every 5 years) to retain possession over the flat. This licence is also subject to timely payment of water and electricity charges.

Further, the allotment of flats is uniform and not dependent on the number or size of previous dwellings. This uniformity also implies that the flat size is not contingent on the size of the family as well. In addition, maintenance of the flat remains the complete responsibility of the beneficiary and the licence can be revoked in cases of poor upkeep of the property. Sub-letting or commercial use of the flat are not permitted and the beneficiaries would potentially get purchasing rights after 20 years of continuous and lawful occupation of their flat.

Beyond the objective guidelines laid out in the policy, investigating the nature of movement evident by implementation strategies and narratives remains a useful point of investigation.

*Resettlement Measures: Forced or Voluntary*

*Global Context*

Before moving on to the nature of resettlement, it is important to differentiate this phenomenon from relocation. Relocation is defined as the physical movement of individuals and families from one place to another. Resettlement, in a much wider sense, includes physical relocation alongside employment, public utilities, social damages, movement compensation and so on. Essentially, resettlement as a concept covers the overall adjustments made in the lives of the relocated individuals beyond just a change in physical space[[15]](#footnote-14).

In terms of the degree of personal agency exercised by slum dwellers during the resettlement process, two categories are generally defined: voluntary and forced resettlement. Examples of voluntary resettlement primarily include randomised evaluations such as those in the United States[[16]](#footnote-15) and India[[17]](#footnote-16); wherein families voluntarily choose to move from a high poverty centrally located residential area to a low poverty suburban locality. A non-experimental case of voluntary resettlement assisted by the local government can be taken from Indonesia. In 2001, 98 slum households along the Brantas River were relocated to Rusunawa (simple, low cost residential apartments) in Kuthobedah.[[18]](#footnote-17) In these examples, a common aspect was the lack of coercion in movement and non-prohibition of moving back to preexisting slum localities. Resettlement processes in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) describe voluntary resettlement in an even more expansive way. In this case, “the government prioritised the autonomous and voluntary actions of the resettled people, focusing on cash compensation, allowed them to choose the locations, and encouraged the self-construction of their houses”[[19]](#footnote-18).

On the other hand, forced resettlement processes are defined by a severe lack of beneficiary participation in choosing the new place of relocation, prohibition of moving back to previous place of residence, lack of support in finding employment opportunities, non-payment of movement costs, substantially higher cost of living and lack of security of land tenure. Forced evictions are a major issue across the Asia-Pacific region, as urban growth increases the size of urban settlements and more land is eyed by the municipal authorities as an asset being encroached upon[[20]](#footnote-19). This pressure to leave one’s home may be direct, in the form of an eviction order backed up by law enforcement and bulldozers, but it can also be more indirect, in the form of harassment or otherwise making daily life untenable, for example through prohibitively expensive basic services[[21]](#footnote-20).

*The Case of Chandigarh*

The Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006) is an expression of such a form of forced resettlement. The reasons are evident.

First, under Section 5, sub-section (c), para (ii) and (iii), the act clearly says that every resident of a notified colony (jhuggis - previous settlements in our study) is bound to vacate during the time and dates specified by the competent authority (the Estate officer under the Capital of Punjab Act, or any other officer appointed by Chandigarh admin for this purpose). Further, the act also requires these residents to remove their belongings, superstructure at their own expense within the time period prescribed for vacating the colony. Moreover, it states that if one does not vacate, they will be liable to be removed in accordance with the process of law.

Second, under Section 6 (A) (ii) and (iii) and S 6(b), the act says that no matter the size of a family; and no matter how many habitations one had in their previous accommodation - they will only be entitled to one room flat in a multistorey building if they are eligible under the scheme.

Third, S6(b) places a 'monthly licence fee' obligation on the allottee. On top of that, S 9 (a) and (b) lay down strict conditions - saying that if the licensee defaults on water and electricity payments, his licence may be revoked.

Yet, it would be misguided to assume that every case wherein changing place of residence is the only option is a case of forced resettlement. To substantiate this point, the case of resettlement of agricultural families in Bangladesh is studied. Alam and Miller argue that forced displacement can be complemented by voluntary resettlement. They seek to claim that in the case of families relocated in the urban peripheries of Khulna city, “even amidst constrained circumstances, people still exercise some agency in deciding when, where and how they might relocate”[[22]](#footnote-21). Hence, it can be promulgated that the nature of resettlement must be characterised beyond the dichotomy of forced or voluntary movement. Infact, there should be strong insistence on the degree of agency exercised by the beneficiaries in determining their life choices and support from the government during the movement and post-movement phases.

While the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006) strongly leans towards the forced resettlement approach, the perception of beneficiaries about the nature of their resettlement remains an important variable.

*Relevance of Self-Perception of the nature of Movement*

In 1961, Fried and Gleicher posited “it is never quite clear whether most people object mainly to being forced to do something they have not voluntarily elected to do; or whether they simply object to relocation, voluntary or involuntary”[[23]](#footnote-22). They raised the question whether the nature of movement impacts the resistance or satisfaction expressed by slum dwellers. Conversely, our research claims, it would be prudent to question whether the way individuals perceive their nature of movement is impacted by their experiences after resettlement.

In this paper, our research argues that self-perception of the nature of movement among the beneficiaries of the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006) goes beyond the aforementioned legal framework. This is evident by the significantly split responses received, despite a uniform policy, when our team conducted interviews and explicitly asked individuals about the nature of their movement.

Instead, beyond the letter of law, our research claims these diverse self-perceptions have the potential of being conditioned by diverse post-relocation experiences. In doing so, this paper does not seek to create a causal link - instead provide preliminary evidence about associative links - between post-movement experiences and self-perception of the nature of movement. In doing so, this research intends to contribute towards the identification and understanding of factors which influence people’s perception of voluntary or forced movements.

**Methodology and scope**

This paper relies on primary data collected from 5 government housing facilities - in Maloya, Dhanas, Mauli Jagran II, Sector 38W and Sector 49 - under the Chandigarh Small Flats Scheme (2006). Across these colonies, a total of 51 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted; internal breakdown is expressed in table 1.

Data collected includes 1) biographical information, 2) access to public amenities such as electricity and water supply, healthcare, education, etc. 3) livelihood opportunities 4) social harmony and public order. Specifically, respondents were also asked how they perceived their resettlement. The choices were “forced”, “voluntary”, “don’t know”, “don’t care”.

*Insert tables about gender and age-group*

After a description of general findings, this paper will compare “forced” and “voluntary” responses by developing correlations and associative links with the 4 fields of data outlined above in 4 subsequent sections.

Biographical data

* Age
* Education
* Family size

Public amenities

* Nature of housing
* Electricity and Water
* Maintenance and repair charges for houses

Livelihood

Social Settings

* Social fabric and connections
* Law and Order

Try to mirror push and pull situations in all 4 categories, then come up with a conclusion which answers to what extent to post movement experiences shape the perceptions of movement

**General Findings**

Vinayak’s piece:

# **The Perception of Forced Movement**

Law calls the movement of residents to be ‘statutorily forced’ in nature. But does the effected party feel the same? Does every relocated and resettled persons - who was asked to move to government allotted houses in peri-urban regions of Chandigarh - feel that there was an absence of choice in their movement? This section tries to give a bird’s eye view about people’s perception of their movement and post-movement experiences – how, not just the black letter of law, but also people’s circumstances make them4 acknowledge their movement as ‘forced’.

It becomes important to disclose that the percentages or reference numbers used in subsequent sections are based on the total number of informants that either perceive their movement to be ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ – they are calculated on the basis of a total that does not include those who did not respond to this question about the nature of their movement. This applies across our analysis unless a specific exception is explicitly stated.

## How do self-claimed ‘forcefully-relocated’ peri-urban residents see things around them?

| Locality | Total | Maloya | Sector 49 | Sector 38-W | Dhanas | Mauli Jagran |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Percentage of informants that report their movement to be forced | 66.6% (18 out of 30 people) | 85% | 50% | 100% | 28.57% | 57.41% |

This finding concludes that every two out of three informants claimed their movement to be forced. Here, 30 people reported about the nature of their movement, and 18 said that it was ‘forced’. Under this, different peri-urban regions – that formed the basis of our field research – provided different numbers. The first three peri-urban regions have a good percentage of people calling their movement to be ‘forced’. But in Sector 38-West, this number goes up to 100%. And there is another interesting aspect to this: out of all other peri-urban regions included in our study, Sector 38-W is the least distant from the core regions of the planned city – the degree of its per-urbanity is comparatively much lower.

Apart from these regions – where the majority don’t feel that their movement, and post-movement settlement is guided by their choice – Dhanas comes out as an exception. Here, more than 70% see their movement as voluntary. Here, the finding becomes interesting in light of the fact that even though Maloya lies to the west of Dhanas – along the northern periphery of Chandigarh – it reflects quite a different public thought. In light of these findings, we can conclude that mere distance between a peri-urban region and the central parts of Chandigarh city - which defines a geospatial degree of peri-urbanity - does not have a direct correlation with how people perceive their movements. There are many other factors that influence the perception.

To substantiate the reason behind these findings, and talk about subjective factors that influence people’s perception in each localized setting, the next few subsections point out the correlation between demographic, economic and social variables, and relocators’ thoughts on the ‘type’ of their movement. Here, we primarily categorize these variables into 4 classes:

* relating to biographical data (like gender, age, educational qualification, etc);
* relating to public amenities (availability of healthcare, electricity, water, etc);
* relating to livelihood opportunities (current employment conditions);
* relating to the social settings (interpersonal relations among people, law and order situation, etc)

### **Biographical Data**

| Age group | 14-20 | 21-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | Above 60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Percentage of informants that report their movement to be forced | 33% | 57% | 37.5% | 37.5% | 60% | 50% |

On the basis of gender, an equal percentage of men and women – out of the total number of informants – reported their movement to be ‘forced’: 42.8% of men and 41.38% of women. On the basis of age, it is important to see that the maximum percentage of people can be seen between the age groups of 21-30 and 51-60. At a broader level, a substantial percentage of people across age groups: at least more than 35% report their movement to be ‘forced’. On this basis, we can safely conclude the relocated residents - aged 51 and above - have the highest numbers of people that do not find their movement to be something they would do by choice

| Educational qualification | 6th pass | 8th pass | 10th pass | 12th pass | Collage | Not educated | Miscellaneous |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Percentage of informants that report their movement to be forced | 0% | 40% | 22% | 0% | 40% | 57% | 15% |

On grounds of educational qualification, the results show a consistent pattern among the educated and uneducated sections of the informants. For the educated class, less than 10% feel that their movement is forced; and more importantly, a large majority does not have any thoughts on how they would look at their relocation. On the other hand, more than 50% of the uneducated informants expressed strong feelings about their ‘forceful’ relocation and settlement. This gives one reasonable inference about both these classes. The educated folks – despite having the knowledge and understanding to question the legal policy – have not really taken any active steps in that direction. They remain oblivious and seem to not want to reflect on their situation. Had they made that effort, the ‘forced’ nature of the government's relocation plan would appear clearly to them – and responses would have looked very different. However, we cannot comment on the certainty of that counterfactual because of differences within the educated class: some informants had just passed 8th grade; some were done with their intermediate; and only a few were in collages. This implies that the pool of educated people that are capable of understanding and seeking awareness of the law's position – nevertheless – remains a small number. On the other hand, the un-educated people’s response does not derive from an apparent ‘awareness’ of the policy; it comes from their practical difficulties in the new neighbourhood – inconvenience associated with transportation to place of work, nearest hospital, education facility; economic hardships in the form of higher rents, higher charges for water and electricity; and most importantly, the element of social othering and psychological sense of alienation in the new society. These aspects are discussed in more detail in the sub-sections that follow.

| Family size | 1-3 | 4-5 | 6-8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Percentage of informants that report their movement to be forced | 0% | 40% | 25-30% |

These numbers show that family size has a definite impact on the public's opinion regarding their post-relocation experience. Bigger families have reported higher numbers because of a practical issue: the allotment of single room, or single room and hall– in a uniform manner – to each person relocated to these peri-urban regions. The Government policy for implementing these relocations did not pay attention to the specific needs of individual households – it was indifferent to the family sizes; and the subsequent space requirements of relocated people. To avoid this situation, the government should have undertaken a case-to-case insight into every person’s data for making the entire process of relocation equitable.

This issue does not have one ramification – it has many others following the primary one. Not only do families experience serious space crunch and inconvenience in accommodating all members within their new accommodation; that also forces them to create separations within the family – where some members are forced to reside in different places in the city, or return to villages. That said, we cannot ignore the fact that some bigger families have openly accepted their movement to be ‘voluntary’ – and this derives from their access to better public amenities and infrastructure due to their movement. In conclusion, the aspect of infrastructure creates perceptions in both directions. despite the fact that a bigger family size is - more or less - correlated to a perception of ‘forced’ movement, infrastructure creates an impact that the next section brings to light.

### **Public amenities**

In the previous section, we shed light on the correlation between family size and people’s perception. That analysis is incomplete without looking at the impact of one’s house type on this correlation. There are two types of houses – temporary (kaccha) and permanent (pukka) houses. While government allotted apartments were permanent houses, built within multi-storey buildings, many people were living in either of the two types - kaccha or pukka - at their previous place of residence. After relocation, and on the basis of their post-relocation experiences, around 45% of people living in pukka houses feel that their movement was forced. On the other hand, this number is much smaller – down to 11% - for the ones previously living in kaccha houses. This observation gives two inferences. *Firstly,* for the second group of people (kutcha house residents), very few perceive their movement as ‘forced’ because for informants with smaller families and lesser spatial needs – to the extent that a government allotted single room accommodation could cater to it – this was a visible form of progress in terms of their place of living. They were forthcoming to shift from weak, temporary houses to government constructed, legally approved accommodation.

*Secondly*, for the first group of people (pukka house residents), we observe a mixed reaction – with an approximately equal number of people perceiving their movement to be forced or voluntary. This observation connects back to the aspect of ‘family size’. To briefly summarize, the perception of this class of people - that has moved from one permanent structure to another - is more strongly affected by family size than the ‘type’ of house. On the other hand, for people relocating from kutcha houses: family size - despite being a strong element to influence perception - did not have an impact that could outweigh the ‘development’ effect associated with a new ‘pakka’ house.

Take, for instance, that you are one of the residents that relocated from a ‘pukka’ house in your pre-relocation residence. If you have a family of 2 to 3 members that is well-settled in a small construction. In that case, this movement will not appear forced to you because nothing much would have changed in terms of your spatial needs. However, if you have a larger family of 5 or more people, then you will have a serious space crunch. Even though you had the possibility of expanding your house in the previous accommodation – by occupying more land; or by constructing another floor on top of the already existing house – you cannot do that after resettlement because the government does not permit any unauthorized construction. Moreover, you cannot seek another apartment because the policy allotment is not sensitive about your family size – it will allot just one house to you.

In terms of water and electricity supply and charges, we observed that supply was inconsistent in residences of people prior to relocation. However, the government provides consistent availability of that in the alloted peri-urban neighbourhoods. While supply creates a positive response, higher charges act as a counter-force. Bills are higher – the meter system is expensive and most people do not install: that makes the billing system arbitrary. And when this is combined with the high penalty charges imposed for default, the overall situation looks economically unfavourable for the resident. All in all, water and electricity have created perceptions on both fronts. But there is one amenity that has only invoked a positive response– toilets. Most people are happy with personal, sanitized and functional toilets – a big change from community or local restrooms in their pre-movement residence. While these aspects consider basic amenities, our data reveals a strong correlation between availability of quality education and perception of movement. On one hand, everyone that is unsatisfied with the quality of educational facilities in their locality report their movement to be forced. On the other hand, out of residents that are satisfied with the quality of education services - 42% perceive their movement to be voluntary and around 38%, forced. This concludes that the poor quality of educational services has caused people to perceive their movement, forced; and their social condition, undesirable

Apart from these amenities, there are some other concerns relating to one’s accommodation – about high maintenance and repair charges. Here, any problems related to the house’s infrastructure (seepage, breaking of walls, damage to water supply or electricity wires, etc) have to be managed by the residents at their own cost. The government does not provide any financial support here. The only financial support they did provide – which was actually done in an inconsistent manner – was when it compensated relocators for their transport and settling costs during the initial days of the policy. Apart from this, rent charges are another important aspect – one that has created a profound impact on people perceiving their movement to be ‘forced’. On an average, where people were not required to pay rent at the previous place, the charges have increased to around eight hundred rupees now. Not just that, these charges are uniformly imposed and are consistently increased as well. This system, like the allotment system, is ignorant of socio-economical particularities of people: it does not account for the economic status of residents and imposes the same burden on each household. Here, we observed an interesting point in our analysis – the government initially assured a lower rent – particularly closer to election – and thereafter, the authorities have not hesitated from increasing charges in the pretext of providing ‘additional’ services like sewage, sanitation, garbage, etc. While this holds on paper, people do not really think that ‘additional’ services are being provided either.

### **Livelihood opportunities**

Informants mostly work in the informal sector – activities like daily wage work, cloth business, tailoring, family business, auto driving, sweets and local street food selling, domestic and household labour work, and even security related activities (colony guards in other central regions of the city). Some work for the authorities as well – as cleaners and garbage collectors in the locality. From our analysis, we cannot draw any concrete relation between the nature of work and the perception of movement. Along with this information, people from both groups – forced and voluntary – did share their concern about increased costs of transportation. However, they were satisfied with the availability of public transport, auto-rickshaw and or any other form of personal transport like cycling or walking for reaching their place of work. Time duration for travel ranged between 15 to 30 minutes across the board. In conclusion, livelihood opportunities play a significant role in shaping people’s choices. But it does not seem to affect their perception about the nature of their movement in a very significant manner at a macro level. Having said that, it is important to highlight that our research is limited in terms of data - empirical premises for making statistically sound conclusions on the correlation between perceived nature of movement and microeconomic living conditions. Despite our reasonable observation at the macro level, our limited empirical evidence offers an unusual insight for Maloya - as compared to other peri-urban regions included in our study. Here, we see that Maloya is very isolated in terms of livelihood because industrial regions - where a large number of relocated residents and poor households find employment - are quite distant from Maloya in comparison to other peri-urban colonies.

### **Social settings**

At a very broad level, there was one undertone in the responses of all informants: even though people appreciate the better availability of public amenities and infrastructure facilities, they feel the lack of social belongingness and interpersonal relationships. People remain hesitant to walk longer distances and travel to nearby neighbourhoods because they risk exclusion – the fear of being stigmatized because of their peripheral position: both in terms of their geographical positioning, and their socio-spatial marginalization. This plays out in the form of fights, crimes and instances of drug abuse, all of which reimpose perceptions of social alienation and hostile, unwelcoming interaction between the new and old residents.

A consequence of such social conditions can be people’s willingness to return to their previous place of residence - irrespective of its real possibility. In our study, we observe 57% of residents who perceive their movement to be forced are willing to return. This stands in stark contrast with a counterpart figure of 7% in the voluntary category. Social discrimination - that shapes people’s perception in such a significant manner - does not limit to ‘people to people’ interactions. The government and police also play a part here. To give an example, one of our informants talked about the aspect of social stigma inflicted by police. They talked about the incidence of harassment and discrimination – that auto drivers, or other relocated people in Maloya – face at the hand of police authorities. This table below shows the percentage of those people - within the

| Locality | Total | Maloya | Sector 49 | Sector 38-W | Dhanas | Mauli Jagran |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Percentage of informants reporting law-and-order situation to be bad, that perceive their movement to be forced | 70% | 40% | 33% | 100% | 30.7% | 25% |
| Percentage of informants reporting law-and-order situation to be good or neutral, that perceive their movement to be forced | 30% | 60% | 67% | 0% | 69.3% | 75% |
| Do people feel safe walking alone in the night (Majority view) | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |

Majority of the people who report ‘forced’ movement, do not find the law-and-order situation to be very good either. In Sector 38-West, the law and situation is said to be ‘bad’ – even though street fights have reduced, informants tell us that police presence and administrative control remains poor; and petty crime – including theft – remains prevalent. Here, while the situation is relatively better, it is largely poor from the standards of Chandigarh’s central regions. In Mauli Jagran, we observe a better state of affairs - most informants feel that the neighbourhood is in good order and walking alone at night is a safe venture. The law-and-order situation is – in general – on the poorer side in Sector 49 and Dhanas. Finally, in Maloya, around 40% of the people reporting ‘forced’ movement do not feel comfortable with the legal order of their neighbourhood; and the others have merely come to terms with the unsatisfactory conditions. This finding - about the tacit acceptance of manageable/neutral law and order situation - is not exclusive to Maloya; it was observed in Dhanas, Sector 49 and Mauli Jagra as well. At its core, this finding points in a direction that this section talks about towards the conclusion - about the minimal impact of ‘unsatisfactory’ public order situation on people’s perception about their movement.

Informants that feel that their movement is ‘voluntary’; or those who do not have an opinion about it, share their observation with the ‘forced’ perception group – that safety against crimes remains insufficient. To summarize, we cannot locate a correlation between the ‘law and order’ situation and people’s perception of their movement. Here, we posit a reasonable explanation for our finding: since most residents relocated from regions of poor public order and crime, they have become indifferent, and under emphasize deteriorating social conditions at newer colonies. This no longer remains a substantive factor to affect their perception. Nevertheless, it is safely concluded that legal mechanisms, police control and administrative actions remain inadequate to effectively manage law-and-order in these peri-urban localities.

A certain degree of ignorance and disregard is experienced, particularly from the government authorities. Complaints regarding electricity and water are not heard. Also, the police does not make frequent trips and ensure public order in the neighbourhood

yuga piece:

From the respondents who were able to classify the nature of their movement within the categories of ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary,’ 33% said it was the latter. Within this third of the responses, the majority were found in the interviewed regions of Dhanas and Sector 49, where 57.14% and 50% respectively, of the classified responses were voluntary. In order to characterise this voluntary perception of government initiated relocation, this section will use the collected primary data from these regions to rationalise the perception of voluntary movement with factors like age, security, education and others. Whilst the deslumification policy of the 2031 Master Plan posits that no relocation is categorically ‘voluntary’ due to the inevitable demolition of the residents’ previous housing (slums), the post-movement experiences nuance this reality and allowed this third of respondents to reconcile with their government-initiated relocation. An assessment of the factors contributing to this perception lends insight into which public policies and amenities are ideal complements to a relocation project.

Beginning with an analysis of biographical and familial data, it is interesting to note that in Dhanas, only one respondent was above 40 years of age, a younger demographic than most other regions interviewed. 45% of the respondents were between 14 and 30 years old. This could suggest that a younger population is more receptive to government-initiated relocation, possibly since their levels of ability and hence accessibility to public services and opportunities are higher. It could extend to higher occupational and skill mobility as well, with the youth having less livelihood hindrances due to greater transferability. However, this finding was not consistent, as in Sector 49, 33% of the respondents were above age 40, with one respondent above age 60 even responding ‘voluntary.’ Hence, age alone cannot explain a voluntary perception, but must be bolstered with accessibility and services. The size of the relocated family is another factor which can alter the perception of movement, as it has direct implications on spaciousness and comfort, and even the possible separation of families. In Dhanas, the family sizes started at 4, with a nuclear family, and only increased to 6, with the addition of either siblings or grandparents. This is fairly consistent in Sector 49 as well, with only 25% of the respondents having a space shared with greater than 6 people. Comments from the respondents showed that the size of within 6 people made for liveable conditions, which didn’t differ too greatly from their previous housing. If there were to be a marriage, though, or other family were to join, extending the ‘size of family,’ the allotted space would fall short, altering the perception of movement.

Another category of factors which segues spaciousness, is general living conditions, comprising both the nature of the housing itself, and also the availability, accessibility and quality of public amenities in the region. The government housing provided to all relocated citizens manifested in either a 1 hall residence, or a 1 hall + 1 room apartment, with electricity and latrine installations as well. 81% of respondents in Dhanas and 67% in Sector 49 asserted that they have a functional electricity and water supply, with rare lapses in availability. They often had personal latrine facilities, and were satisfied with sewage and garbage disposal mechanisms in and around their housing as well. The Ministry of Housing’s 2015 statistical compendium displayed that as of 2011 34% of households didn’t have on-premises latrine facilities, and specifically 31% of slums did not. The relocation examined in this study provided this on-premise amenity to every affected household which posits a concretely positive upgrade in convenience and hygiene facilities, prompting satisfaction and hence the perception of voluntary movement. The same convenience and satisfaction of services was noted in the case of healthcare; both Dhanas and Sector 49 having dispensaries located in the region which also provided consultation. Residents of Dhanas noted that there were multiple options for healthcare services, including private doctors and hospitals in the vicinity, but they claimed that the dispensary suffices especially since its improvements in recent times. It was noted that for more serious issues, residents of Sector 49 would have to travel to the Sector 45 hospital, requiring them to pay for an auto-rickshaw ride. However, this is rare and doesn’t serve as a hindrance. Therefore, the residents have a high level of assurance in having emergency or healthcare needs served, contributing to their comfort and trust in a government-issued relocation.

The next factor under the umbrella of public amenities, is educational institutions, where once again Dhanas and Sector 49 showed the greatest positive responses. A 100% of respondents in both regions answered either ‘Yes’ or ‘Neutral’ when asked if they were satisfied with the quality of education available; with not a single response saying ‘No.’ Qualitatively, parents and students themselves appreciated the faculty, syllabus and english-medium orientation of the institutions they went to, and were able to enroll in those close to their homes. As per Census India, the literacy rate of Dhanas is 85.44%, as compared to 73.6% of the general Chandigarh district. It is possible that the availability of higher quality education provides greater literacy rates, improving employability and future livelihood opportuntities. For families who were relocated and are experiencing this, their view of an overall lifestyle improvement can be fuelled, and again prompt a voluntary perception. It could also be an inciting factor for relocation to the region itself. Here, it can be useful to assess the degree of periurbanality of these regions as well, with respect to the urbanisation of their immediate surroundings. Sector 49 is located by Khajeri, a region with hotels, cinemas, ATMs and more, which despite having deep infrastrucutral problems of its own, shows a higher degree of urbanality. Therefore, despite being in the Southwest periphery, its proximity to business activity and development could be a desirable factor.

For the majority of citizens relocated to Sector 49 and Dhanas, they have been in their current homes for 9 - 15 years. During this time, a key factor which could make or break their acceptance of the relocation is the safety and trust in their community. Similarly to the statistics for education, 100% of the respondents from these regions said that the law and order situation was ‘Neutral’ (67%) or ‘Good’ (33%). Not a single response who claimed voluntary movement suggested a ‘bad’ law and order situation. However, there were clashing answers here, with some claiming that the level of crime in Dhanas is overwhelming, whilst others say it is handled efficiently by law enforcement. A more pervasive sentiment was that of a lack of overtly peaceful community spaces like parks and gardens. The feeling of security within a community is essential to the voluntary perception of relocation, given that these households used to have this spirit in their previous residences. In order to not only prevent fear or dissent at relocation, but also actively encourage community building, public infrastructure like playgrounds and open spaces are left to desire by those relocated.

The field of development induced displacement and resettlement is conventionally associated with large scale developmental projects such as construction of dams (eg. Sardar Sarovar Dam), transportation projects (eg. Mumbai Urban Transport Project) and mining (eg. Chaal Coal Mine).

Average slum household size of chandigarh is 4.4

Only goa has a more uneven sex ratio in slums than chandigarh and gujurat (tied)

Chandigarh has the highest gender differential literacy rate in slums

* Rhetorics in chandigarh
* National level statistics about slums
* Case of chandigarh having one of the highest growth ratios since 1971
* Making chandigarh slum free a key policy goal
* Most of these have happened under the chandigarh small flats scheme of 2006
* Explain the policy

A snapshot into the field of resettlement of slum dwellers to social housing

Trends/Rhetoric in India

Trends/Rhetoric in Chandigarh

The 2006 policy in question

The role of law enforcement agencies

Research Methodology and Findings

Our methodology description

terminology/typology and the meaning of forced or voluntary movement

Our broad findings

Unearthing reasons for such trends

Why 2/3rd people feel their movement is forced

Why 1/3rd people feel their movement is voluntary

Why do more people feel their movement is forced than voluntary, what does it reflect about state policy and enforcement agencies?

Policy recommendations

What should be future things to be kept in mind during pre-relocation planning

What changes can be made to the existing colonies

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2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. https://thewire.in/economy/india-upward-social-mobility-inequality-economy-education [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
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